The Navy initially attempted to decontaminate many of the surviving ships from the Baker test. But nothing short of taking them down to bare metal worked, and the Navy crews were unprepared to deal with decontamination on such a large scale. Many were exposed to high levels of radiation. The radiological safety officer for Operation Crossroads, Army doctor Colonel Stafford Warren, lobbied hard to abandon the effort, and finally convinced the head of the task force, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William H. P. Blandy, by showing him an x-ray of a fish from the lagoon–an x-ray taken using only the radiation coming from plutonium in the fish itself.
Always/Never: The Quest for Safety, Control & Survivability is a first-person documentary film about the use, control, detonation safety, and survivability of US nuclear weapons with an emphasis on the contributions of the DOE/NNSA nuclear weapon laboratories from 1945 to 1991. The historical interaction between technology, military operations, and national policy has never before been told in this detail.
What does this exercise tell us? Two things, in my mind. One, this 1956 target list is pretty nuts, especially given the high-yield characteristics of the US nuclear stockpile in 1956. This strikes me as going a bit beyond mere deterrence, the consequence of letting military planners have just a little bit too much freedom in determining what absolutely had to have a nuclear weapon placed on it.
The second is to reiterate how amazing it is that this got declassified in the first place. When I had heard about it originally, I was pretty surprised. The US government usually considered target information to be pretty classified, even when it is kind of obvious (we target Russian nuclear missile silos? You don’t say…). The reason, of course, is that if you can go very closely over a target list, you can “debug” the mind of the nuclear strategist who made it — what they thought was important, what they knew, and what they would do about their knowledge. Though times have changed a lot since 1956, a lot of those assumptions are probably still at least partially valid today, so they tend to keep that sort of thing under wraps.
Humorous payoff matrix for CINCSAC re decision to launch nuke armed bombers on Possibly false warning of USSR attack pic.twitter.com/RhCWnjNxoA
— martin pfeiffer (@NuclearAnthro)April 15, 2016
National Emergency Alarm Repeater system.
For semi-obvious reasons ICBMs made this pretty moot. #DeusExAtomica pic.twitter.com/lTyzprpXKx— martin pfeiffer (@NuclearAnthro)April 4, 2016
The targets of a 1956 US nuclear war plan, mapped in NUKEMAP (in its new high-contrast mode), with yesterday’s weather data used to guide the fallout plumes. Over 1,100 targets. For the sake of the “simulation,” I used a 1.2 Mt weapon for each detonation (in reality, the yields varied a lot, and targets likely had multiple weapons targeted on them). For surface bursts (which would generate fallout), if this happened today the prompt casualties would be (according to NUKEMAP’s casualty estimations) some 78 million fatalities and 128 million injuries. For airbursts optimized for “soft” targets (like cities), it would be 125 million fatalities, 244 million injuries (but little fallout).
How I did this: I scraped the data from the Future of Life Institute’s page about the target list, which itself was taken from the list that the National Security Archive got declassified. I then made a few small modifications to the NUKEMAP that allowed it to accept generated lists of huge numbers of targets in this way. I wrote a separate script to grab the weather data from openweathermap.org and then another that would calculate the casualties in a way that wouldn’t overload the casualty database. This is just a back-of-the-envelope model. If you are interested in crashing your browser by loading this into it (it takes about 1.5 GB of RAM to load all of the detonations into Google Maps!), click here.












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